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1 Abstract
Return Oriented programming was surfaced first a decade ago, and was built to overcome the
buffer exploit defence mechanisms like ASLR, DEP (or Wˆ X) by method of reusing the system
code in the form of gadgets which are stitched together to make a Turing complete attack.
And to perform Turing complete attack would require greater efforts which are quite complex,
and there is very little research available for performing a Turing complete attack. So, in this
project, we are systemising the knowledge of the existing research that can be used to perform
a Turing complete ROP attack.
2 Introduction
Return Oriented Programming (ROP) is a technique by which an attacker can induce arbitrary
behavior in a program by diverting the program control flow, without injecting any code.
A return-oriented program chains together short instruction sequences already present in a
programs address space, each of them ends in a return instruction. There are different ways
to demonstrate ROP exploitation, one popular demonstration is to deactivate ASLR which is
short form of Address Space Layout Randomization and it is a common defense for ROP attacks
which works by randomly moving the segments of a program around in memory, preventing the
attacker from predicting the address of useful gadgets. So, deactivating ASLR at the beginning
of the implementation is a common demonstration. In this work, for our own simplicity, we
tried to implement an attack on ROP by deactivating ASLR before implementing the exploit
and writing our program. After ASLR deactivation, we implement our program in which a
buffer overflow would occur by defining a function in our program which points to another
function called function 1 and it also points to function 2 and so on which we explain more in
section 5.
3 Related Work
In order to find a way to exploit an attack in ROP, we went through some solutions against
the attack such as G-free which is the only general solution as each defense method, rest of the
mechanisms provide solutions to a specific built. We also found different methods to attack ROP
such as ’Automated ROP’, ’ROP without return’ and Return-to-libc which we will summarize
in the following subsections. In addition, we found various tools to find gadgets for performing
ROP namely ’ROPgadget’ and’ROPeme’
3.1 G-Free
As [1], G-free is a compiler based approach against any possible form of ROP. It can eliminate all
the unaligned free-branch instructions which are located inside an executable binary and protect
them against attacker data misuse. This method provide an executable gadget-free solution
which removes links between necessary chain sequence instructions that cannot be targeted by
any possible ROP attack. In this solution, the first step is to eliminate any unaligned free-
brunch instructions. The second step is to protect aligned free-brunch instructions to be secure
against misuse. To achieve this goal, [1] employs two techniques: ret instructions to encrypt
return address and a cookie-based technique to protect jmp*/call*. Ret instructions provides
a short header and saved the encrypted return addresses into the stack. By this technique,
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whenever the attacker jump into a position of a function, he reaches the footer. As a result,
these jumps transfer the attacker to an incorrect address that attacker cannot control.
3.2 Tools for finding gadgets
In return oriented programming, the core idea is to get useful instruction sequences from the
code and chain these instructions together. For this, the attacker should collect some useful
sequence of instructions and then reuse these sequences as basic blocks to execute the code. The
most important factor in ROP is that these collections of code provide a set of functionalities
which allow the attacker to achieve touring completeness without any code injecting. In the next
step, the attacker should chain these code sequences in an order to manipulate the program
control flow. Gadgets are these valid sequences of instructions to change the control flow
satisfyingly [1]. In this section, we introduce some existing tools which enable us to find gadgets
and chain them together.
4 Background
ROP was built to overcome the shortcomings of Buffer overflow, where attacker was able to
insert his arbitrary code in the stack segment and execute it, which was prevented by making
the stack segment not executable and introducing ASLR made it more difficult for injection of
malicious code. Hence ROP’s were built exploiting the existing defense mechanisms and reusing
the code.
4.1 Bufferoverflow
In a buffer overflow attack, the attacker tries to overflow the stack by exceeding the limited
length of the stack and modify the return address and points it to the address of his injected ma-
licious code [4]. According to [7], buffer overflow attack exploits lack of array or buffer bound in
compiler. In figure 1, a typical stack layout had been shown in which when a function had been
called, how some stack entries like return address can be corrupted by a malicious copy opera-
tion.
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Figure 1: Stack showing bufferoverflow working
5 Our Work
Aim of this section is to demonstrate chaining of gadgets, so we wrote a simple buffer exploit
from where we chained various types of functions viz., Functions with or without Parameters,
and chaining of global functions and their respective behavior on stack which is the replication
of actual gadgets in a general way but there are much of assembly coding involved while using
gadgets. For this, we have referred blog posts published by various researchers[3][4][5].
For the Implementation we used a 32-bit version of Debian based Linux Mint 18.1 operating
system, and our exploit code was written in C program compiled with GCC complier, gdb
for debugging, and extensively used objdump for finding addresses of chaining functions. Most
modern Operating systems implement the randomizing the Address layout (ASLR) which makes
difficult for a buffer exploit to execute since the code segment of stack is randomized preventing
the attacker obtaining the return address of the functions, but for a 32 bit system attackers have
often find a way to brute force. But for our work we considered disabling the ASLR manually
during the compilation time
gcc vuln . c −o vuln −fno−stack−p r o t e c t o r
-fno-stack-protector disables the stack smashing protector thereby the addresses of the program
are not randomized by the compiler, which enables us to control the code sequence.
On the complied code we run objdump d vuln2 to obtain the exact memory addresses of
the functions and to know the buffer length, and exploit the code sequence by overflowing the
buffer and modifying the return addresses to arbitrary code snippets. Code Snippet below
shows exploit code where we have induced a buffer overflow in the function echo() from where
we will be executing arbitrary function and variables to demonstrate the chaining of gadgets in
two phases: first phase with functions without argument and Second phase is functions with
arguments and global variables.
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#inc lude<s t d i o . h>
#inc lude<s t d l i b . h>
// g l o b a l v a r i a b l e
char s t r [ 2 0 ] = ”MyROPExploit ” ;
// func t i on without parameters
void SecretFunctionWithoutParm (){
p r i n t f (”Welcome to s e c r e t func t i on without parameters ” ) ;
}
// func t i on with parameters
void SecretFunctionWithParm ( char argv [ ] ) {
p r i n t f (”Welcome to another s e c r e t func t i on with parameter %s \n” , argv ) ;
}
// func t i on with b u f f e r e x p l o i t
void echo ( ){
char b u f f e r [ 2 0 ] ;
p r i n t f (” Enter some text :\n ” ) ;
s can f (”%s ” , b u f f e r ) ; // b u f f e r over f l ow
p r i n t f (”You entered : %s \n” , b u f f e r ) ;
}
i n t main ( ){
echo ( ) ;
r e turn 0 ;
}
In order to chain gadgets, we should learn about two important things about finding ad-
dresses of the functions and the length of the buffer. Both of them can be learnt to use either
gdb debugger or objdump. we demonstrate using objdump.
5.1 Finding length of buffer and return address
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Figure 2: object dump of exploit program
figure 2 shows the snippet of objdump for the exploit code, from echo() function we can see the
compiler allocation for the buff variable
8048502: 8d 45 e4 l e a −0x1c(%ebp) ,% eax
compiler has allocated 0X1C or 28 bits for variable so in order to overflow we need to use a
buffer of length 32 bits to achieve the bufferoverflow.
Figure 3: bufferoverflow
To find the address of functions, we can just use the starting addresses provided by objdump
080484 a4 <SecretFunctionWithParm>:
0804848b <SecretFunctionWithoutParm>:
5.2 ROP Exploit with and without arguments
As we explained in previous subsection we have address of functions required for the exploit.Now
we have to replace the original return address, but to know where to insert return address First
we should understand how the stack in figure 4 works.
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Figure 4: stack overview of a normal function with paramaters
Function is stored on stack starting from a high memory address to and it grows towards lower
addresses and stores RET address of invoking function in our case main function. and the value
of buffer variable is stored from a lower address and grows towards higher memory address. By
overflowing the values of buffer variable we can modify the actual return address of the invoking
function to some arbitrary code segment and execute malicious action as shown in figure 5.
Figure 5: stack overview of a normal function with fake return address
Now we use this concept and inject the address of SecretFunctionWithParm 080484a4 to our
exploit and obtained the intended results as in figure 6.
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Figure 6: Demo of injecting fake return address to SecretFunctionWithParm()
Now since we are able to insert a arbitrary function, we try inserting arbitrary arguments to
the exploit functions in figure 7
Figure 7: Demo of injecting fake return address with parameter to SecretFunctionWithParm()
And now to demonstrate the chaining of gadgets, by chaining the SecretFunction() iteratively
in figure 8
Figure 8: Demo of injecting fake return address to SecretFunction() iteratively
And lastly we want show inserting of global variable to SecretFunctionWithParm() for this we
found the address of global variable using gdb debugger and results can be seen on figure 9
Figure 9: Demo of injecting global variable to SecretFunctionWithParm()
6 Conclusion
Return Oriented Programming maybe a decade old and not many exploits were reported using
ROP, and it is stealth feature, which cannot be detected by the Intrusion Detection Systems
or any Signature based detection systems as it reuses the system trusted library to perform
the malicious action. Many Defense mechanisms have been proposed like G-Free[1] which can
provide a solution to all the systems, but most of other works focused on providing system
specific solutions, and implementation of G-free is not widely adopted, Hence Research on
ROP seems to be very limited so in our project we demonstrated gadget chaining in form of
chaining functions which is exact replication that can be used to perform a turing complete
attack.
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